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Designing a Work-Friendly Tax System 
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Taxes tend to influence individual choices between labor and leisure, 
and high effective marginal tax rates on earned income tend to discourage 
work.1  In particular, the empirical evidence shows that high effective mar-
ginal tax rates tend to discourage work by low- and moderate-income indi-
viduals, especially those that are trying to work their way out of the wel-
fare system.2  Unfortunately, the current federal tax system often imposes 
its highest effective marginal tax rates on just those individuals. The pur-
pose of this paper is to suggest some simple ways to reduce those high 
effective marginal tax rates.  One approach would be to replace the current 
earned income tax credit with a $2,000 per worker credit and a refundable 
$1,000 per child tax credit.  A more comprehensive approach would be to 
integrate the individual income tax and Social Security tax systems into a 
single, comprehensive income tax system with refundable $2,000 per 
worker earned income tax credits and with $1,000 or $2,000 per person 
refundable personal tax credits or demogrants.  In short, this paper consid-
  
 * Copyright 2004, Jonathan Barry Forman.  Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 
1973, Northwestern University; M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of 
Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George Washington University.  Delegate to the 2002 National 
Summit on Retirement Savings; Member of the Board of Trustees of the Oklahoma Public Employees 
Retirement System. 
 1. See e.g. Gordon Richards, The Effect of Lower FICA Taxes: A Retrospective Econometric 
Analysis, Tax Notes, 245 (Jan. 11, 1999) (finding that if the Social Security payroll tax had not been 
raised from 1984 onward, 1. gross domestic product would have been higher, by more than $80 billion; 
2. labor supply would have been higher, by roughly 800,000; and 3. employment would have been 
higher, by roughly one million); see also Robert K. Triest, Fundamental Tax Reform and Labor Supply, 
Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 247 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale, eds., 1996); 
Congressional Budget Office, Labor Supply and Taxes (Jan. 1996) (available at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3372&sequence=0) (accessed May 13, 2004); Nada Eissa, Tax 
Reforms and Labor Supply, Tax Policy and the Economy 10, 120 (James Poterba, ed., 1996); Jerry 
Hauseman, Labor Supply, How Taxes Affect Economic Behavior 27 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph Pech-
man eds., 1981). 
 2. See e.g. Norma B. Coe et al., Does Work Pay? A Summary of the Work Incentives under TANF, 
New Federalism: Issues and Options for States, Paper No. A-28 (1998) (available at http:// 
www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=5960) (accessed May 13, 2004); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 405 (1997); Sheldon 
Danziger et al., Does it Pay to Move from Welfare to Work? (Joint Center for Poverty Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 254, 2002) (available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/poverty/pdf/v2workpays-
danzetal.pdf) (accessed May 13, 2004). 
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ers how to make the federal tax system more work-friendly for low- and 
moderate-income workers. 
II.  THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IMPOSES HIGH TAX RATES ON LOW- 
AND MODERATE- INCOME WORKERS 
A. The Basic Computation 
The federal income tax is imposed on a taxpayer’s taxable income.3  A 
taxpayer may file a return as an unmarried individual, as a head of house-
hold, as a married couple filing a joint return, or as a married individual 
filing a separate return.4 
As a starting point, a taxpayer first determines the amount of the tax-
payer’s gross income.5  The term “gross income” means all income from 
whatever source derived, including, but not limited to, the wages, salaries, 
tips, gains, dividends, interest, rents, and royalties received by the taxpayer 
during the taxable year.6 
A taxpayer subtracts certain deductions from gross income to get tax-
able income.7  Most taxpayers simply claim a standard deduction8 and per-
sonal exemptions.9  Many taxpayers, however, claim certain itemized de-
ductions in lieu of the standard deduction.10  Also, certain other deductions 
are allowed without regard to whether the taxpayer chooses to itemize.11 
Each year, the U.S. Department of Treasury indexes the standard de-
duction amounts, personal exemption amounts, maximum earned income 
credit, and income tax rate tables to reflect the prior year’s change in the 
Consumer Price Index.12  For 2004, the basic standard deduction amounts 
are $9,700 for married couples filing jointly and surviving spouses; $7,150 
for heads of households; and $4,850 for unmarried individuals and for mar-
ried individuals filing separately.13  Aged or blind taxpayers generally are 
entitled to claim an additional standard deduction amount of $950, except 
  
 3. I.R.C. §§ 1, 63. 
 4. I.R.C. §§ 2, 6013. 
 5. I.R.C. § 61. 
 6. Id. 
 7. I.R.C. § 63(a). 
 8. I.R.C. § 63(b), (c). 
 9. I.R.C. § 151. 
 10. I.R.C. § 63(d). 
 11. I.R.C. § 62. 
 12. See e.g. Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184. 
 13. Id. 
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that aged or blind single individuals can claim an additional standard de-
duction amount of $1,200.14 
The personal exemption amount for 2004 is $3,100 for each taxpayer 
and dependent.15  For example, a married couple with two children can 
claim four personal exemptions.  The amount of the personal exemption is 
phased out for taxpayers whose adjusted gross income exceeds certain 
threshold amounts.16  In 2004, for example, a married couple filing a joint 
return will start to lose its personal exemptions once its adjusted gross in-
come exceeds $214,050, and its exemptions will be completely phased out 
once its income reaches $336,550. 
A taxpayer’s standard deduction and personal exemptions create a 
simple income tax threshold.  For example, in 2004, an unmarried individ-
ual can claim a $4,850 standard deduction and a $3,100 personal exemp-
tion.17  Consequently, she would have no taxable income until her gross 
income exceeded $7,950.  Similarly, a married couple with two dependent 
children could claim a standard deduction of $9,700 and four $3,100 per-
sonal exemptions.  As a result, the married couple would not have any tax-
able income unless their gross income exceeded $22,100.18 
B. Tax Rates 
For a taxpayer with gross income in excess of her simple income tax 
threshold, her regular tax liability would be determined by applying the 10, 
15, 25, 33, and 35 percent rates to taxable income.19  Table 1 shows the 
basic standard deductions, personal exemptions, simple income tax thresh-
olds, and income tax rates applicable to some typical taxpayers in 2004.  
For comparison, Table 1 also shows the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services’ poverty income guidelines for those taxpayers.20  Also, 
by way of comparison, it is worth noting that the minimum wage in 2004 is 
$5.15 per hour,21 and an individual working full-time, year-round at the 
minimum wage would earn just $10,712.22  
  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (The exemption amounts are reduced by 2 percent for each $2,500 (or frac-
tion thereof) of adjusted gross income in excess of the applicable threshold amount.). 
 17. Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184. 
 18. $22,100 = $9,700 + 4 × $3,100. 
 19. I.R.C. § 1. 
 20. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 7336 (Feb. 13, 2004). 
 21. Also, the minimum wage has not been increased since September 1, 1997.  29 U.S.C. § 206; 
U.S. Department of Labor, Minimum Wage (Web Page) (available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/ 
wages/minimumwage.htm) (accessed May 13, 2004).     
 22. $10,712 = $5.15 per hour × 40 hours per week × 52 weeks per year. 
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TABLE 1 
Standard Deductions, Personal Exemptions, Simple Income Tax Thresholds, Pov-




Filing Joint Returns 







$4,850 $  9,700 $  7,150 
Personal ex-
emptions 




$7,950 $22,100 $16,450 
Poverty income 
guideline 






10% $0 to 
$7,150 
$0 to $14,300 $0 to $10,200 
15% $7,150 to 
$29,050 
$14,300 to $58,100 $10,200 to 
$38,900 
25% $29,050 to 
$70,350 
$58,100 to $117,250 $38,900 to 
$100,500 














Over $319,100 Over $319,100 
Source:  Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184; Annual Update of the 
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 7336 (Feb. 13, 2004). 
 
Of note, however, a special rule provides that the maximum tax rate on 
dividends and net capital gains is generally 15 percent.23  Moreover, that 
special rule also provides for a 5 percent rate on the dividends and net capi-
tal gains received by moderate-income taxpayers (those in the 10 and 15 
percent income brackets).24 
  
 23. I.R.C. § 1(h). 
 24. Moreover, this rate will fall to 0 percent in 2008. 
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The amount that the taxpayer must actually pay or, alternatively, will 
receive as a refund is equal to the taxpayer’s regular tax liability minus 
allowable credits.  Pertinent here, certain low-income taxpayers are entitled 
to claim the refundable earned income tax credit and the partially refund-
able child tax credit on their federal income tax returns. 
C. The Earned Income Tax Credit 
The earned income tax credit is a refundable tax credit for certain low-
income workers.25  In 2004, for example, a family with two or more quali-
fying children is entitled to a refundable earned income tax credit of up to 
$4,300.26  The credit is computed as 40 percent of the first $10,750 of 
earned income.27  For married couples filing joint returns, the maximum 
credit is reduced by 21.06 percent of earned income (or adjusted gross in-
come, if greater) in excess of $15,040 and is entirely phased out at $35,458 
of income.28  For heads of household, the maximum credit phases out over 
the range from $14,040 to $34,458.29 
Similarly, a family with one child is entitled to an earned income credit 
of up to $2,604.30 The credit is computed as 34 percent of the first $7,660 
of earned income.31  For married couples filing joint returns, the maximum 
credit is reduced by 15.98 percent of earned income (or adjusted gross in-
come, if greater) in excess of $15,040 and is entirely phased out at $31,338 
of income.32  For heads of household, the maximum credit phases out over 
the range from $14,040 to $30,338.33 
Also, in 2004, childless individuals between the ages of twenty-five 
and sixty-five are entitled to an earned income credit of up to $390.  The 
credit is computed as 7.65 percent of the first $5,100 of earned income.  
For married couples filing joint returns, the maximum credit is reduced by 
7.65 percent of earned income (or adjusted gross income, if greater) in 
excess of $7,390 and is entirely phased out at $12,490 of income.  For 
heads of household and single individuals, the maximum credit phases out 
over the range from $6,390 to $11,490. 
  
 25. I.R.C. § 32. 
 26. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3) (The term “qualifying child” generally includes a child under the age of 19, a 
child under the age of 24 who is in college, or a child of any age that is permanently and totally dis-
abled.); Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184.   
 27. Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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Figure 1 shows the earned income credit amounts available to various 
married couples in 2004.34 
 
D. The Child Tax Credit 
Taxpayers with qualifying children under the age of seventeen can 
claim a tax credit of up to $1,000 per child.35  The child tax credit is first 
applied to offset a taxpayer’s income tax liability, and, for taxpayers with 
earned income in excess of $10,750 in 2004, a portion of the credit is re-
fundable.36  In 2004, for example, a married couple with two children and 
$15,000 of earned income would be entitled to a refundable child tax credit 
of $425,37 and a married couple with two children and $30,750 of earned 
income would be entitled to claim its full $2,000 worth of child tax cred-
its.38 
  
 34. All figures were created by the author using the tax law and rates applicable in 2004.  See e.g. 
Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184. 
 35. I.R.C. § 24. 
 36. I.R.C. § 24(d); Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184.  The child tax credit is refundable to 
the extent of 10 percent of the taxpayer’s earned income in excess of $10,750. 
 37. Id.  $425 = .10 × ($15,000 - $10,750). 
 38. Actually, a married couple with two children and at least $26,425 of earned income in 2004 can 
claim the full $2,000 worth of child tax credits:  $432.50 would offset the couple’s income tax liability, 
and $1,567.50 would be refundable.  Recall from Table 1 that this couple has a simple income tax 
threshold of $22,100 and pays tax at a 10 percent rate on its first $14,300 of taxable income, and recall 
from n. 36, supra, that in 2004 the couple’s child tax credit is refundable to the extent of 10 percent of 
the couple’s earned income in excess of $10,750.  Consequently, the formula to solve for the income 
 



























Married Couple with No Children Married Couple with 1 Child Married Couple with 2 or More Children  
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These child tax credits are phased out once the taxpayer’s adjusted 
gross income reaches $110,000 for married couples filing joint returns, 
$55,000 for married couples filing separately, and $75,000 for all other 
taxpayers.39  For example, a married couple with two qualifying children 
would see its 2 child tax credits phase out as its adjusted gross income in-
creased from $110,000 to $130,000.  
E. The Alternative Minimum Tax  
Some individuals are also subject to the so-called “alternative mini-
mum tax” which is payable, in addition to all other tax liabilities, to the 
extent that it exceeds the taxpayer’s regular individual income tax liabili-
ties.40  The tax is imposed at rates of 26 and 28 percent on “alternative 
minimum taxable income” in excess of an exemption amount.41 
F. Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Earned Income under the Income Tax 
The current federal income tax system imposes relatively high tax rates 
on earned income.  To be sure, the federal income tax system is generally 
progressive.42  That is, taxpayers with higher incomes generally pay tax at 
higher rates than those with lower incomes.  Because of the many phase-
outs and other special rules, however, effective marginal tax rates can 
bounce all over the place, and the highest effective marginal tax rates are 
often imposed on low-income taxpayers in the phase-out range of the 
earned income tax credit.43  In that regard, Figure 2a shows the effective 
marginal income tax rates imposed on unmarried individuals with varying 
amounts of earned income in 2004; Figure 2b shows the effective marginal 
income tax rates imposed on typical married couples with two minor chil-
dren and with varying amounts of earned income; and Figure 2c shows the 
  
level (I) at which this couple gets to first claim all of its $2,000 worth of child tax credits is:  $2,000 = 
.10 × (I - $22,100) + .10 × (I - $10,750).  Solving for I, I = $26,425.    
 39. I.R.C. § 24(b). 
 40. I.R.C. § 55. 
 41. For 2004, the exemption amounts are $58,000 for married couples filing joint returns, $40,250 
for single individuals and heads of household, and $29,000 for married individuals filing separate 
returns.  Id. 
 42. See e.g. Congressional Budget Office, Effective Federal Tax Rates, 1997 to 2000 (2003) (avail-
able at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.efm?index=4514&sequence0&from=0) (accessed May 13, 2004). 
 43. See e.g. Gregory G. Geisler, Current Year Tax Laws that Cause Low Visibility of an Individual’s 
Effective Marginal Tax Rate, Tax Notes, 627 (Nov. 3, 2003); Leonard Burman & Mohammed Adeel 
Saleem, Hidden Taxes and Subsidies, Tax Notes, 1437 (Sept. 15, 2003). 
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effective marginal income tax rates imposed on a typical head of house-
hold with two minor children.44 
 
 































Effective Marginal Tax Rate  
  
 44. These and subsequent figures dealing with effective marginal tax rates under the income tax 
incorporate the required computations under the alternative minimum tax, as well.  In that regard, 
however, these figures underestimate the impact of the alternative minimum tax on high-income tax-
payers because all of the underlying computations assume that all taxpayers will claim the standard 
deduction rather than itemizing their deductions.  In reality, most higher-income taxpayers would, in 
fact, itemize their deductions, and while those itemized deductions would be allowable in computing 
taxable income, some would not be allowable in computing their alternative minimum tax liability.  For 
example, unreimbursed employee business expenses and state income taxes are deductible for income 
tax purposes but not for alternative minimum tax purposes.  I.R.C. §§ 55, 56(b)(1)(A), 63(d), 67(b), 
162(a), 164(a)(3).   Pertinent here, the net effect is that itemized deductions reduce the income tax rates 
and liabilities faced by higher-income taxpayers, but simultaneously subject more of them to the higher 
effective tax rates resulting from the alternative minimum tax.  For more about the impact of the alter-
native minimum tax, see e.g. Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT:  Projections and Problems, Tax 
Notes, 105 (July 7, 2003). 
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FIGURE 2b Effective Marginal Income Tax Rates on Married Couples with Two Children and 


































Effective Marginal Tax Rate  
FIGURE 2c  Effective Marginal Income Tax Rates on Heads of Household with Two Children 

































Effective Marginal Tax Rate  
Some explanation is in order.  Initially, the unmarried taxpayer in Fig-
ure 2a has income below her simple income tax threshold of $7,950 
($7,950 = $4,850 standard deduction + $3,100 personal exemption), and 
she receives an earned income credit equal to 7.65 percent of her first 
$5,100 of earned income.  Once her earned income exceeds $5,100, she is 
entitled to the maximum credit of $390, and once her income exceeds 
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$6,390, she starts to lose that credit at the rate of 7.65 percent until the 
credit is fully phased out at $11,490.  Also, once her income reaches her 
simple income tax threshold of $7,950, she is subject to positive income 
tax rates, initially at the 10 percent rate and then eventually at the 15, 25, 
28, 33, and 35 percent rates.  Also, once her income exceeds $142,700, she 
will begin to lose her $3,100 personal exemption, and that exemption will 
be completely taken away when her income reaches $265,200. 
Similarly, the married couple in Figure 2b initially has income below 
its $22,100 simple income tax threshold and receives an earned income tax 
credit equal to 40 percent of its first $10,750 of earned income.  Once the 
couple’s earned income exceeds $10,750, the couple is entitled to the 
maximum earned income tax credit of $4,300, and once the couple’s in-
come exceeds $15,040, the couple starts to lose that credit at the rate of 
21.06 percent, until the credit is fully phased out at $35,458.  Also, once 
the couple’s earned income reaches $10,750, the couple’s two $1,000 child 
tax credits become refundable to the extent of 10 percent of the couple’s 
earned income in excess of $10,750, until the full $2,000 is allowed.  Once 
the couple’s income reaches its simple income tax threshold of $22,100, 
the couple is subject to positive income tax rates, initially at the 10 percent 
rate and then eventually at the 15, 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent rates.  Also, 
once the couple’s income exceeds $110,000, the couple will begin to lose 
its two $1,000 child tax credits, and those credits will be completely taken 
away when the couple’s income reaches $130,000.  Finally, once the cou-
ple’s income exceeds $214,050, the couple will lose its four $3,100 per-
sonal exemptions, and those exemptions will be completely taken away 
when the couple’s income reaches $336,550. 
A similar explanation could be offered for the effective marginal in-
come tax rates applicable to the head of household with two children por-
trayed in Figure 2c. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the current tax system often im-
poses significant marriage penalties on low-income workers who claim the 
earned income tax credit.45  In 2004, for example, if a single father with 
two children and $15,000 of earnings marries a single mother with two 
children and $15,000 of earnings, the couple will face a hefty marriage 
penalty.  Before the marriage, each would be entitled to an earned income 
credit of $4,098,46 for a total of around $8,200.  After the marriage, the 
couple would have a combined income of $30,000, which is far into the 
phase-out range of the earned income tax credit.  Together, they would be 
  
 45. I.R.C. § 32. 
 46. $4,097.82 = $4.300 - .2106 ($15,000 - $14,040). 
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entitled to a single earned income tax credit of just $1,14947 for an earned 
income tax credit marriage penalty of $7,047.48  Their total marriage pen-
alty would be a little bit smaller, however, as the couple would now be 
entitled to claim a larger portion of their child tax credits.49 
III. THE SOCIAL SECURITY PAYROLL TAX IMPOSES HIGH TAX RATES ON 
LOW- AND MODERATE- INCOME WORKERS 
A. The Basic Computation 
Social Security taxes are levied on earnings in employment and self-
employment covered by Social Security, with portions of the total tax allo-
cated by law to each of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund 
(OASI), the Disability Insurance trust fund (DI), and the Medicare Hospital 
Insurance trust fund (HI).50  For 2004, employees pay Social Security taxes 
of 7.65 percent of the first $87,900 of wages and 1.45 percent of wages 
over $87,900.51  The lion’s share of these payroll taxes is used to finance 
the OASI program (5.30 percent of wages), and the rest is used to pay for 
Disability Insurance (0.90 percent) and Medicare (1.45 percent).52  
Employers pay a matching Social Security tax of 7.65 percent of up to 
$87,900 of wages of each covered employee.53  Employees are not allowed 
to deduct their portion of Social Security taxes for income tax purposes.54  
  
 47. $1,149.42 = $4,300 - .2106 ($30,000 - $15,040). 
 48. $7,047 = $ 4,098 + $4,098 - $1,149. 
 49. For example, the couple would now be eligible for four child tax credits, of which $1,925 would 
be refundable, up from just $850 before the marriage.  After marriage:  $1,925 = .10 × ($30,000 - 
$10,750).  Before marriage: $850 = 2 × $425; $425 = .10 × ($15,000 - $10,750).  The couple would get 
a refund of $3,074, computed as follows:  the couple would have taxable income of $1,700 ($1,700 = 
$30,000 - $9,700 - [6 × $3,100]); their regular tax liability would be $170 (.10 × $1,700); their earned 
income tax credit would be $1,149; and their child tax credits would be $2,095 ($170 nonrefundable + 
$1,925 refundable). 
 50. I.R.C. §§ 1401, 3101, 3111. 
 51. Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2004, 68 Fed. Reg. 60437, 60437-60, 442 
(Oct. 22, 2003). 
 52. Comm. Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 2004 Green Book:  Background 
Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means Section 
1, Social Security:  The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Programs, 1-39 tbl. 1-1 
(updated March 17, 2004) (available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Documents.asp?Section =813).  
The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance program provides monthly cash benefits to retired workers and 
their dependents and to survivors of insured workers.  Id.  The Disability Insurance program provides 
monthly cash benefits for disabled workers under age 65 and their dependents.  Id.  Medicare is a 
federal health care program for the aged and certain disabled persons.  Id. at Section 2, Medicare (up-
dated March 17, 2004). 
 53. Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2004, supra n. 51. 
 54. I.R.C. §§ 275(a)(1)(A), 3502(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-2(a) (1960). 
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The employer’s portion of Social Security taxes, however, is excluded 
from the employee’s income for income tax purposes.55 
Similarly, self-employed workers pay an equivalent Social Security tax 
of 15.3 percent on the first $87,900 of self-employment earnings and 2.9 
percent of self-employment earnings over that amount.  Self-employed 
individuals may deduct half of these taxes for both Social Security and 
income tax purposes.56  This puts self-employed individuals in a position 
that is approximately equivalent to that of employees.  
Social Security and Medicare taxes have grown significantly over the 
years.  In 1940, for example, an employee and her employer each paid a 
Social Security payroll tax of just 1 percent of the first $3,000 in wages, for 
a total of 2 percent of wages.57  In 2004, however, an employee and em-
ployer must pay 7.65 percent of the first $87,900 of wages, and 2.9 percent 
on wages over $87,900.58  Not surprisingly, social insurance taxes rose 
from just 19 percent of federal revenues in 1965 to 37.8 percent of federal 
revenues in 2002, and from just 3.2 percent of gross domestic product in 
1965 to 6.8 percent of gross domestic product in 2002.59  In effect, from 
1965 to 2002, workers saw their payroll tax burden double. 
B.  Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Earned Income Under the Social Se-
curity Payroll Tax 
Figure 3 shows the effective marginal Social Security payroll tax rates 
imposed on workers with varying levels of earned income.  In that regard, 
most economists believe that the burden of most payroll taxes paid by em-
ployers actually falls on the employees themselves.60  In effect, workers 
bear the brunt of the employment taxes paid by their employers.  Overall, 
the payroll tax is a regressive tax; workers pay roughly 15.3 percent of 
their first $87,900 of earned income and 2.9 percent on earnings in excess 
of $87,900.  As is common in this type of analysis, Figure 3 ignores the 
value of any future Social Security and Medicare benefits that might result 
from these payroll taxes.61   
  
 55. H. R. Rpt. 98-47 at 125-126 (Mar. 24, 1983) (reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 404, 414-15). 
 56. I.R.C. §§ 164(f), 1402(a)(12). 
 57. Comm. Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, supra n. 52 at 1-39 tbl. 1-1. 
 58. See supra n. 51 and accompanying text. 
 59. Comm. Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, supra n. 52, at app. I, Budget Tables, 
I-16 tbl. I-10, I-17 tbl. I-11 (posted Oct. 31, 2003); see also Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) 
of the Income Tax, 21 (W.W. Norton 1997) (to the same effect). 
 60. See e.g. Congressional Budget Office, supra n. 42, at 2-3. 
 61. See e.g. id. at 5. 
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Marginal Tax Rates on Earned Income  
Most households pay more Social Security payroll taxes than income 
taxes.62  For example, in the year 2000, 70.6 percent of households paid 
more payroll taxes than income taxes.  This figure drops to 41.3 percent if 
only the employee’s share is considered.63  Moreover, low-income house-
holds are much more likely than higher-income households to pay more 
payroll taxes than income taxes.  For example, in the year 2000, almost 98 
percent of households in the lowest income quintile paid more payroll than 
income taxes, while only 26 percent in the top quintile paid more in payroll 
taxes than they did in income taxes.64  This relationship is not surprising 
given the lack of a tax threshold before the Social Security payroll tax 
kicks in, the $87,900 cap on the Old-Age and Survivors and Disability 
Insurance taxes, and the progressivity of the income tax rate structure.65 
  
 62. Id. at 2; Dan R. Mastromarco, What’s so Fair about a Tax on Income?, Tax Notes, 217 (Oct. 11, 
1999) (to the same effect). 
 63. Congressional Budget Office, supra n. 42, at 17 tbl. 2. 
 64. Id.   
 65. For example, because of standard deductions and personal exemptions, a married couple with 
two children and $20,000 of earned income would owe no income tax.  See Table 1 and accompanying 
explanation.  On the other hand, because the Social Security payroll tax lacks personal exemptions and 
standard deductions, that couple would owe $1,530 in payroll taxes ($1,530 = .0765 × $20,000), and 
the couple’s employer(s) would owe a matching amount.  See supra n. 51 and accompanying text. 
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IV. EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES ON EARNED INCOME AS A RESULT 
OF INCOME AND PAYROLL TAXES COMBINED 
 
When both income and payroll taxes are considered, the effective mar-
ginal tax rates on earned income can be extraordinarily high, especially on 
low- and moderate-income workers with children.  Once again, effective 
marginal tax rates fluctuate, rather than increase steadily as earned income 
increases.  For example, Figure 4a shows the effective marginal tax rates 
on earned income imposed on married couples with two children.  Figure 
4a is the result of combining the income tax and payroll tax data underly-
ing Figures 2b and 3.66  Figure 4a shows that the highest marginal tax rates 
are imposed on moderate-income couples earning around $30,000 a year.  
Figure 4a also includes a linear trendline, so that the reader can see what a 
more rational, progressive tax rate structure would look like. 
FIGURE 4a Combined Effective Marginal Tax Rate (income and payroll taxes), Married 
































Effective Marginal Tax Rate Linear Trendline  
Similarly, Figure 4b shows similar results for heads of household with 
two children and earned income only.  Figure 4b shows that some moder-
ate-income heads of households face effective marginal tax rates of over 
50 percent.  Indeed, the highest effective marginal tax rates are imposed on 
heads of household earning around $30,000 a year.  Once again, a linear 
  
 66. See supra n. 55 and accompanying text.  Using the Social Security payroll tax rates of 15.3 and 
2.9 percent slightly overstates their impact, as the employer’s portion (one-half) of the applicable 
Social Security payroll taxes is excluded from income for income tax purposes.   
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trendline is included, so that the reader can imagine what a more rational, 
progressive tax rate structure might look like. 
FIGURE 4b  Combined Effective Marginal Tax Rates (income and payroll), Heads of 

































Combined Effective Marginal Tax Rate (income and payroll taxes) Linear Trendline  
V.  HIGH EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES CAN DISCOURAGE WORK 
Taxes tend to influence individual choices between labor and leisure, 
and high effective marginal tax rates on earned income tend to discourage 
work.67  Taxes on earned income reduce the rewards from work and so 
tend to make leisure relatively more attractive than work.68  This is the 
substitution effect:  high tax rates will cause individuals to substitute lei-
sure for work.69  On the other hand, the lower relative wages after taxes 
mean that workers will get less after-tax income from the same amount of 
work effort and so will have less ability to consume all goods, including 
leisure.70  This is the income effect:  high tax rates or benefit-reduction 
rates will cause individuals to work harder in order to restore that lost in-
come.71  As the substitution and income effects work in opposite direc-
tions, the net effect on work can be ambiguous:  theory alone cannot an-
  
 67. See references in n. 1, supra. 
 68. Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 20-23, 374-376 (6th ed., 2002). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  Leisure is a “normal good – consumption increases when income increases and vice versa.” 
Id. at 22. 
 71. Id. at 20-23, 374-376. 
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swer the question of how labor force behavior is affected by changes in the 
tax system.  In that regard, however the empirical evidence suggests that 
taxes and benefit-reductions tend to discourage work by low-skilled work-
ers and secondary earners but do not have as much of an impact on other 
workers.72  
In general, if the government wants to minimize work disincentives, it 
should keep the effective marginal tax rates on earned income as low as 
possible.73  Moreover, it is especially important to have low effective mar-
ginal tax rates on low- and moderate-income workers as these workers are 
likely to have large behavioral responses to high rates.74  In that regard, 
Figures 4a and 4b reveal one of the fundamental problems with the current 
federal tax system – some of the highest effective marginal tax rates are 
imposed on moderate-income taxpayers.  These high effective marginal tax 
rates invariably discourage heads of household from working more hours 
or improving their skills and discourage secondary earners from even both-
ering to enter the work force.75 
Worse still, these high effective marginal tax rates in the federal tax 
system often combine with similarly high benefit-reduction rates in the 
welfare system to result in virtually confiscatory effective tax rates on the 
earned income of many low- and moderate-income taxpayers trying to 
work their way out of the welfare system.76  A recent study by Dan R. 
Mastromarco came to similar conclusions: 
Such steeply progressive marginal tax rates punish lower-middle-
class workers.  Once state taxes are considered, many lower-
middle-income single parents keep only 40 cents of each dollar 
they earn.  Once the costs of commuting, child care, and other 
  
 72. See e.g. id. at 377; Richards, supra n. 1; Eissa, supra n. 1. 
 73. We know that the distortions that result from taxes increase as effective marginal tax rates in-
crease.  Indeed, economists suggest that the distortions increase exponentially with increases in the 
effective tax rate.  Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-income Households, Tax 
Notes, 1191, 1198 (Aug. 23, 1999).   For example, a 90 percent payroll tax rate is likely to induce nine 
times (not three times) as much distortion as a 30 percent payroll tax rate.   
 74. See e.g. id. at 1198; Rosen, supra n. 68, at 377; Eissa, supra n. 1.  So-called “optimal tax” theory 
also suggests that it is important to keep marginal tax rates low.  See e.g. James Mirlees, An Explora-
tion into the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation, 38 Rev.  Econ. Studies 175 (1971); Joel Slemrod et 
al., The Optimal Two-bracket Linear Income Tax, 53 J.  Pub. Econ. 269 (1994); M.A. Sillamaa, How 
Work Effort Responds to Wage Taxation:  An Experimental Test of a Zero Top Marginal Tax Rate, 73 
J. Pub. Econ. 125 (1999).  Interestingly, however, much of the optimal tax literature suggests that there 
would be efficiency gains from having marginal tax rates that fall at higher income levels.  This ap-
proach could “induce greater labor supply from the most productive segment of society, with the in-
creased tax revenue used to lower the tax burden of the least productive segment.”  Slemrod et al., 
supra at 285-286. 
 75. See e.g. Eissa, supra n. 1. 
 76. See e.g. Coe et al., supra n. 1. 
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work-related expenses are considered, choosing to work makes 
very little economic sense for single-parent families.77 
In short, the high effective marginal tax rates imposed by the current 
federal tax system contribute to the often confiscatory effective marginal 
tax rates faced by many low- and moderate-income workers struggling to 
leave welfare.  Consequently, reducing the applicable federal tax rates 
would help reduce the work disincentives in the combined tax and transfer 
system. 
VI. A MODEST REFORM:  RESTRUCTURE THE EARNED INCOME TAX 
CREDIT 
A.  A Social Security Payroll Tax Exemption 
One way to reduce effective marginal tax rates on low- and moderate-
income workers would be to restructure the earned income tax credit.  One 
approach would be to replace the credit with a $10,000 exemption from 
Social Security taxes and a $1,000 per child refundable tax credit – a work 
benefit and a child benefit.78 
Consider a single parent with two children.  Under current law she can 
claim an earned income credit of up to $4,300, but that credit phases out at 
the rate of 21.06 percent of her income in excess of $14,040.  Replacing 
the current credit with a $10,000 per worker exemption and a $1,000 per 
child tax credit, our hypothetical parent would receive $2,765 worth of tax 
benefits, but those benefits would not phase-out as her income increased.  
A $10,000 exemption from Social Security payroll taxes would be worth 
$765 per worker (or $1,530 if the credit applied to the employer portion as 
well), and the two child tax credits would be worth $2,000.  As there 
would be no reason to phase out either of these tax benefits, millions of 
low-income workers would no longer face the extraordinarily high effec-
tive marginal tax rates that can result from the current phase-out of the 
earned income tax credit. 
Alternatively, it could make sense to allow taxpayers to claim standard 
deductions and personal exemptions under the Social Security tax system, 
as well as under the income tax system.  In 2004, for example, a single 
  
 77. Mastromarco, supra n. 62, at 235. 
 78. See e.g. Jonathan B. Forman, Simplification for Low Income Taxpayers:  Some Options, 57 Ohio 
St. L.J. 145 (1996); George K. Yin & Jonathan B. Forman, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit 
Program to Provide More Effective Assistance for the Working Poor, Tax Notes, 951 (May 17, 1993); 
see also George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to 
Reform the Earned Income Credit Program, 11 Am. J. Tax Policy 225 (1994). 
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parent with two children can claim a $7,150 standard deduction and three 
$3,100 personal exemptions under the income tax, for a simple income tax 
threshold of $16,450.79  If she were allowed to claim a $16,450 tax thresh-
old for the Social Security payroll tax as well, she would save $1,258 in 
payroll taxes, and the earned income credit could be reduced accordingly.80  
Again, the benefit could be twice as large if the tax threshold also applied 
to the employer portion of the Social Security tax.  Refundable child tax 
credits could once again be used to give her another $1,000 per child.  
Again, under this approach, taxpayers would no longer face extraordinarily 
high effective marginal tax rates like those that result from the phase-out of 
the current earned income tax credit.  
B.  A $2,000 Per Worker Earned Income Credit 
Another approach for keeping marginal effective tax rates low would 
be to replace the current earned income tax credit with a universal $2,000 
per worker earned income tax credit and a $1,000 per child refundable tax 
credit.81  The $2,000 per worker earned income tax credit could be com-
puted as 20 percent of the first $10,000 of earned income, and it might not 
phase-out at all, or phase-out only very slowly at the rate of 10 percent of 
income from $20,000 to $40,000.  Figure 5 shows how such a $2,000 per 
worker earned income tax credit could work, with, or without, a phase-out. 
  
 79. See tbl. 1, supra. 
 80. $1,258.425 = .0765 × $16,450. 
 81. Along the same lines, some have suggested replacing the earned income tax credit with a $1,530 
payroll tax credit, to offset the payroll taxes incurred on the first $10,000 of earnings, and with a $2,000 
per child “simplified family credit.”  See e.g. H.R. 3655, 108th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2003) (introduced by 
Dennis J. Kucinich, Barbara Lee, and Bernie Sanders); Timothy Catts, Kucinich Launches Tax Plan for 
Capital Hill and Campaign Trail, Tax Notes, 1264-1266 (Dec. 15, 2003); Max B. Sawicky, And Now 
for Something Completely Different: Doing a Fiscal U-Turn, Tax Notes, 1353-1354 (Dec. 15, 2003). 
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Under this approach, a single parent with two children would be enti-
tled to almost $4,300 in refundable tax credits.  She could claim two 
$1,000 refundable child tax credits, and if she worked full-time, year-
round, even at the minimum wage she could pick up another $2,000 from 
the $2,000 per worker earned income credit, for a total of $4,000. 
In fact, there would be no particular reason for either of these tax cred-
its to phase out.  Under current law, child tax credits are available to heads 
of household earning up to $75,000, but it would make sense to eliminate 
even that phase-out and recover the lost revenue through otherwise broad-
ening the tax base or through a modest increase in tax rates.  In 2004, the 
current earned income credit phases out as a head of household’s income 
increases from $14,040 to $34,458.  Even if the $2,000 per worker credit 
were phased out over that range, the phase-out rate would need to be just 
9.8 percent, far less than the current credit’s 21.06 percent phase-out rate.82  
Of course, it could also make sense to raise the phase-out range.  For ex-
ample, Figure 5 shows how a $2,000 per worker earned income tax credit 
could be phased out at the rate of 10 percent of income from $20,000 to 
$40,000.  
Marriage penalties would also be smaller in a system of $2,000 per 
worker earned income tax credits.  If two workers got married, each would 
  
 82. .0979527 = $2,000 ÷ ($34,458 - $14,040).  See supra n. 28 and accompanying text for an expla-
nation of the earned income tax credit and its 21.06 percent phase-out for taxpayers with two or more 
children.  
FIGURE 5  Hypothetical $2,000 Per Worker Earned Income Tax
























Universal $2,000 Per Worker Credit $2,000 Per Worker Credit with Phase-out 
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still be entitled to an earned income credit of up to $2,000.  They might 
lose little or no credit by getting married depending on how the phase-out 
(if any) worked.  
C.  Use of Demogrants Instead of Child Tax Credits 
Instead of refundable child tax credits, it could make sense to have a 
system of refundable personal tax credits or demogrants.  A demogrant is a 
cash transfer paid to every person without regard to income level.83  For 
example, consider a simple demogrant that guaranteed every person $1,000 
a year.  Under such a system, an unmarried individual would receive 
$1,000, a parent with two children would receive $3,000, and a married 
couple with two children would receive $4,000.   
Demogrants could be paid out in the form of refundable personal tax 
credits; and these personal tax credits could replace personal exemptions, 
standard deductions, child tax credits, and the child-related component of 
the earned income credit.  For example, every person could receive a 
$1,000 or $2,000 refundable personal tax credit and then they could be 
taxed at relatively low rates on all their income.84  Also, some of the reve-
nue needed to pay for these personal tax credits could come from cashing 
out food stamps and other means-tested and non-means-tested transfer 
programs.85  
Refundable tax credits have an equal value for all individuals, whereas 
deductions are more valuable to individuals facing higher tax brackets.  For 
example, the current personal exemption ($3,100 in 2004) is worth $868 to 
taxpayers in the 28 percent tax bracket but just $310 to taxpayers in the 10 
percent bracket.86  On the other hand, a $1,000 refundable personal tax 
credit would have the same value for all individuals. 
  
 83. See e.g. Shaviro, supra n. 73, at 1198. 
 84. Alternatively, some have suggested replacing many of the current family benefits with a $2,000 
per child “simplified family credit.”  See e.g. Sawicky, supra n. 81. 
 85. In 2002, for example, the federal government spent almost $20 billion on food stamp benefits.  
Comm. Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, supra n. 52, at Section 15, Other Programs 
(Food Stamps), 15-FOODSTAMPS-5 tbl. 15-FOODSTAMPS-1 (posted Dec. 17, 2003).  See e.g. 
Jonathan B. Forman, Time to Cash Out Food Stamps, Legal Times:  Law and Lobbying in the Nation’s 
Capital, 36 (Feb. 22, 1993); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs 50-67 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Paper No. 194, 2d series, 
2003) (available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/) (accessed May 17, 2004). 
 86. The value of a tax deduction is equal to the amount of the deduction times the taxpayer’s mar-
ginal tax bracket.  So a taxpayer in the 28 percent bracket will save $868 from a $3,100 personal ex-
emption, while a taxpayer in the 10 percent bracket will save just $310.  $868 = .28 × $3,100; $310 = 
.10 × $3,100. 
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Like most other transfer programs, demogrants would result in some 
reduction in work effort by beneficiaries.87   The reduction in work effort, 
however, should be much less than under welfare-type transfer programs 
with their high benefit-reduction rates.  Demogrants, by definition, are 
universal and do not phase out.  Facing only normal tax rates and no phase-
out or benefit-reduction, the recipients of demogrants would face low ef-
fective marginal tax rates and so should have virtually every incentive to 
get out and work to earn more money to support themselves and their fami-
lies.  
VII.  A MORE COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION 
Beyond simply restructuring the earned income tax credit, it could be 
even more advantageous to fundamentally restructure the current tax sys-
tem, for example, by integrating the current income and Social Security 
taxes into a single, comprehensive income tax system.88  That integrated 
tax system could have just a few progressive tax rates, and it could easily 
accommodate a few refundable tax credits. 
For example, imagine an integrated tax system with $2,000 per worker 
refundable earned income tax credits (computed as 20 percent of the first 
$10,000 of earned income), $2,000 per person refundable personal tax 
credits, and two tax rates: 20 percent of the first $100,000 of income and 
30 percent on income in excess of $100,000.  Assume further that there is 
no phase-out of either the personal tax credits or the worker credits.  Table 
2 and Figure 6 show how this integrated, comprehensive income tax sys-
tem would work for single parents with two children making from $0 to 
$200,000, and Figure 7 shows the effective marginal tax rates imposed by 
this tax system at various income levels.   
  
 87. See e.g. Robert A. Moffitt, Economic Effects of Means-tested Transfers in the U.S., Tax Policy 
and the Economy vol. 16, 1 (James Poterba, 2002). 
 88. The alternative minimum tax would also disappear. 
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TABLE 2   
How an Integrated, Comprehensive Income Tax System Would Affect a 
Single Parent with Two Children ($2,000 Demogrants, $2,000 per Worker 












tax Income  
             0 $6,000          0              0    $6,000 
    $5,000 $6,000 $1,000     $1,000   $11,000 
  $10,000 $6,000 $2,000     $2,000   $16,000 
  $20,000 $6,000 $2,000     $4,000   $24,000 
  $30,000 $6,000 $2,000     $6,000   $32,000 
  $40,000 $6,000 $2,000     $8,000   $40,000 
  $50,000 $6,000 $2,000   $10,000   $48,000 
$100,000 $6,000 $2,000   $20,000   $88,000 
$150,000 $6,000 $2,000   $35,000 $123,000 
$200,000 $6,000 $2,000   $50,000 $158,000 
 
FIGURE 6  How an Integrated, Comprehensive Income Tax System Would Affect a Single 
Parent with Two Children 
















Earned Income Post-tax Income  
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FIGURE 7  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for a Parent with Two Children and Earned Income 
Only in a World with an Integrated, Comprehensive Income Tax System 

























Effective Marginal Tax Rate Linear Trendline  
Together, Table 2 and Figures 6 and 7 show how this simple tax and 
demogrant system could help meet the income needs of low-income fami-
lies without undermining the incentive to work.  In sharp contrast to the 
current tax system (as portrayed in Figures 2c and 4b), Figure 7 shows that 
marginal tax rates would not fluctuate, nor would the highest effective 
marginal tax rates be imposed on low- and moderate-income taxpayers. 
To avoid marriage penalties and bonuses, it would also make sense for 
this integrated, comprehensive income tax system to have individual filing, 
rather than joint filing for married couples.89  Then, each worker could 
claim her own personal tax credit and her own worker credit and face the 
20-percent rate before hitting the 30-percent maximum tax rate.  Also, this 
comprehensive income tax system could easily be designed as a return-
free, final withholding system.  The amounts withheld from employers and 
other income sources would be the tax.  Consequently, few taxpayers 
would ever need to file tax returns.90  Such a return-free system could sig-
nificantly reduce burdens on both taxpayers and the IRS.91 
  
 89. See e.g. Jonathan B. Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties?, 30 Family L. Q. 1 
(1996). 
 90. See e.g. U.S. Dept. of Treas., Report to the Congress on Return-Free Tax Systems: Tax Simplifi-
cation is a Prerequisite (U.S. Dept. Treas. 2003); William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an 
Alternative Tax System 23 Va. Tax Rev. 205 (2003). 
 91. The Treasury report estimates that up to 52 million taxpayers (41 percent) could be freed from 
having to file income tax returns with an exact withholding system.  U.S. Dept. of Treas., supra n. 90, 
at 24.  Most of these people no longer would have to gather information, become familiar with tax 
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All in all, an integrated, comprehensive income tax system with re-
fundable credits would be simpler to administer than the current tax sys-
tem, and it would minimize work disincentives on low- and moderate-
income workers with children.  In short, this approach would make the tax 
system work-friendly. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
The current federal tax system imposes some of its highest effective 
marginal tax rates on low- and moderate-income workers.   These high 
effective tax rates result primarily from the combination of income taxes, 
Social Security taxes, and the phase-out of the earned income tax credit.  
The problem is that these high effective tax rates tend to discourage work 
effort and skill development by many of the very individuals who are try-
ing to work their way out of the welfare system. 
One way to reduce these high effective marginal tax rates on low- and 
moderate-income workers would be to restructure the earned income tax 
credit.  For example, one approach would be to replace the current credit 
with a $10,000 per worker exemption from Social Security taxes and a 
$1,000 per child refundable tax credit.  A similar approach would be to 
replace the current earned income tax credit with a universal $2,000 per 
worker earned income tax credit and a $1,000 per child refundable tax 
credit. 
A more comprehensive approach would be to fundamentally restruc-
ture the current system by integrating the current income and Social Secu-
rity tax systems into a single, comprehensive income tax system.  That 
system could have just a few progressive tax rates, and it could easily ac-
commodate a few refundable tax credits.  For example, an integrated, com-
prehensive income tax system might have $2,000 per worker refundable 
earned income tax credits, $2,000 per person refundable personal tax cred-
its, and just two tax rates: 20 percent of the first $100,000 of income and 
30 percent on income in excess of $100,000.  Such a system would be eas-
ier to administer than the current system, and it would minimize work dis-
  
laws, or prepare and file returns.  The burden on the IRS also would be greatly reduced.  Moreover, 
even more taxpayers could be freed from having to file returns if Congress were to restructure the tax 
system.  In that regard, the Treasury report notes that exact withholding would work best if we had 
fewer tax rates; fewer deductions, allowances, and credits; and if interest and dividend income were 
taxed at a flat rate and withheld at the source.  It would also make sense to get rid of joint tax returns 
and instead have the unit of taxation be the individual, not the family.  Id. at 2.  Of note, pursuant to 
Section 2004(a) of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the Secretary 
of the Treasury is required to develop procedures for implementing a return-free system by the year 
2007.  Id. at 1. 
File: Forman(Macro)moyertableformat Created on: 5/31/2004 11:15:00 AM Last Printed: 6/16/2004 6:38:00 PM 
2004 DESIGNING A WORK-FRIENDLY TAX SYSTEM 155 
incentives on low- and moderate-income workers with children.  In short, 
this approach would make the tax system work-friendly. 
 
